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O N THE PHYLOGENY 
O F HUMAN MORALITY 
N . Bischof 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
"Morali ty" is understood here as a h u m a n behavioral 
complex that is (a) essentially cross-cultural, or u n i v e r s a l l y 
human, a n d (b) apparently absent in animals , or specifi-
c a l l y h u m a n . 
The first point suggests that morality is at least partly 
based on genetic adaptation, the second that this adapta-
tion is a recent occurrence in phylogeny. 
In the fol lowing paragraphs I shall examine: 
1. What phenomena are meant w h e n we speak of "hu-
m a n morality"; 
2. what kind of analogs to h u m a n morality c a n be found 
on the a n i m a l level; 
3. how the emergence of these analogs c a n be explained 
phylogenetically; a n d 
4. how h u m a n morality m a y have developed in the frame-
work of these analogs. 
At present, theories in this area cannot meet the usual 
Standards of scientific verifiability. The fol lowing Statements 
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are presented as heuristic hypotheses a n d intended to stim-
ulate discussion. 
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F H U M A N M O R A L I T Y 
Form Characteristics 
N o n n s : In every h u m a n society we find certain generally 
accepted value judgments, or norms, that define a profile of 
differential approva l for the total ränge of possible h u m a n 
behaviors. In the simplest case, these norms are reflected in 
the predominant behaviora l patterns of the society: some 
behaviors meriting d isapproval s imply never, or hardly 
ever, appear. Moreover, these norms m a y be expressed in 
gossip or rumor (e.g., about neighboring enemy groups), or 
in the form of legends or myths. O n l y in h igh cultures are 
norms expressed explicitly as a n oral or written code of law. 
Sancüons: II a n individual 's behavior deviates from the 
norms, he must expect a hostile reaction, either from the in-
jured person or his representative, or from the entire group 
or its delegated representatives. Such a reaction might con-
sist in : (a) mi ld or severe e x c o m m u n i c a t i o n (ranging from 
derision to casting out), (b) special p u n i s h m e n t . Punish-
ment is based on the idea that one action c a n counter-
balance another: breaking norms disturbs a n equi l ibr ium 
w h i c h must be restored through expiation. In expiation the 
emphasis is not on the guilty person but on the offense, 
w h i c h explains phenomena like vicarious atonement. 
I n t e r n a l i z a t i o n : Norm-conforming behavior also occurs 
under conditions w h i c h preclude sanctions, for example, in 
the temporary absence of a punishing authority. The Inhibi-
tion feit under such conditions is ca l led "conscience," a n d 
acting against this inhibition results in negative affects (feel-
ings of g u i l t or shame). Feelings of guilt seem to be related 
to disobedience to authorities. Feelings of shame connote 
the loss of social esteem. They reflect a regression to the 
stage of a n irresponsible infant w h o is not yet to be taken 
seriously. Feelings of guilt a n d shame appear not only after 
norm-violat ing action but c a n also accompany the inten-
tion, a n d thus c a n prevent or foil the action. These feelings 
c a n also follow unintended norm violations. There is a cer-
tain tendency to develop milder social sanctions in this lat-
ter case except w h e n a n offense occurs unintentionally 
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while a n o t h e r norm-offending intention is b e i n g carried 
out. 
Content Characteristics 
O n e set of mora l norms c a n be understood as attempts to 
Protect group members from the u n b o u n d e d s e l f - i n t e r e s t of 
others (the b a n n i n g of murder, theft, witchcraft, slander, 
adultery). 
A second set of norms, w h i c h some anthropologists see as 
the prototype of morality, is composed of m a r r i a g e r u l e s 
proscribing a too "near" a n d too "far" choice of partner (the 
incest a n d rac ia l taboos, respectively). 
A third set of norms regulate the relations with the s p i r -
i t u a l world : prescriptions dea l ing with honoring gods, an-
cestors, or totems. The first three Mosa ic commandments 
belong to this set. In pictorial allegories, they appear to-
gether on a special tablet. 
A fourth set of norms apparently serves to establish a n d 
corroborate the individual 's personal m a t u r i t y (rules of 
moderation, asceticism, abstinence, rules against excessive 
or infantile drive gratification). 
Finally, without c la iming completeness for this list, we 
may mention a fifth set of norms that serves to spare the so-
ciety of h a v i n g to take notice of certain forms of behavior 
(norms of discretion i n sexual intercourse, defecation, men-
struation, birth, a n d death). 
There appears to be no "general mora l pr inciple" from 
w h i c h a l l the concrete norms may be deduced, just as there 
exists no "general dr ive" or "general a n i m a l . " Phenomena 
of life cannot be systematized as be ing special applications 
of a general formula. They are special branches of a com-
mon tree, a substantially different proposition. 
M O R A L - A N A L O G O U S BEHAVIOR IN A N I M A L S 
Content Analogies 
The specifically h u m a n character of morality might imply 
that intentions suppressed by morality are "bestial ." This 
idea is illustrated in the figure of St. George as the dragon-
slayer. However, " a m o r a l " behavior does not appear in the 
a n i m a l wor ld as frequently as such a Suggestion would 
lead one to expect. 
Lorenz (8) has introduced the notion of "moral-analogous" 
a n i m a l behavior. It denotes a group of instinctive inhibitions 
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that constrains selfishness a n d guarantees a relatively 
uniform distribution of advantages a n d disadvantages in 
the group. Accord ing to Lorenz, rank Orders in the ani -
m a l wor ld serve to help the weaker members, since the 
a lpha-an imal usually attacks the beta, as if in support 
of the g a m m a . Furthermore, an imals possessing dangerous 
weapons do not frequently use them in intraspecies con-
flicts, but rather perform ritualized combat. The superior in 
such a contest contents himself, even though he could kill 
his Opponent, with infl ict ing a comparatively minor "disad-
vantage." Lorenz also mentions the w a r n i n g against, or 
even the attacking of, predators threatening a group mem-
ber, even though this involves a risk for the warner himself. 
Inbreeding, hybridizat ion, a n d homosexuality are effi-
ciently avoided in most a n i m a l species through behavior 
patterns based on a complicated interplay of instinctual 
forces. (For instinctive inbreeding barriers, see refs. (1), (2), 
a n d following section o n Possible Explanations of M o r a l -
Analogous Behavior.) 
A n i m a l behavior exhibits m a n y analogs of ly ing a n d 
cheating, even toward members of the same group. Nev-
ertheless these practices are kept within limits. Counterac-
tive mechanisms are therefore postulated to exist (14), but 
have not yet been a n a l y z e d . In some species, if a n individ-
ual has found access to certain resources, even higher-
ranking group members do not compete for them. This has 
been established for food-resources in chimpanzees (5) a n d 
for claims to females i n H a m a d r y a s baboons (7). Frequently, 
the respecting of a l i e n territory is also assigned to this group 
of behaviors. 
Formal Analogies 
H a b i t f o r m a t i o n and " s u p e r s t i t i o n " : A n i m a l behavior is 
never entirely predictable . Particularly animals that are 
able to learn from experience must be capable of making 
alternative choices w h e n confronted with new situations. 
After the learning phase , behaviora l variabil i ty is reduced 
by w a y of habit formation; the experienced a n i m a l behaves 
more predictably. 
The pattern of habit formation seems to have the following 
motivational background. Unfamiliari ty is dangerous a n d 
leads to emotional " a r o u s a l . " This m a y be a fascinating ex-
perience if arousal tc lerance is sufficiently high, as is typi-
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ca l in the juvenile stage. Otherwise, arousal produces anx-
iety. A Situation is unfamil iar as long as no appropriate 
response to it is known. The appropriate response is learned 
either (a) from other group members, without substantial in-
crease in arousal , or (b) through u n a i d e d exploration. The 
latter method presupposes a h igh arousal tolerance. 
Signs of arousal reappear w h e n a n a n i m a l happens to 
deviate from a learned response. This m a y be expected 
since, in a way, the breaking of a habit renders the Situation 
unfamiliar a g a i n (9). The a n i m a l m a y be prepared to cope 
with this increased arousal . Otherwise, considerable anx-
iety m a y result from the deviation. In this way, habits often 
appear to have a "superstitious" or "compuls ive" flavor. 
M o b b i n g and "shame": The rule that anyth ing unfamiliar 
produces fear a n d anything familiär lends security applies 
also to encounters with conspecifics a n d leads to socioetho-
logically fundamental distinction between group members 
a n d strangers. Conspecif ics become familiär (a) through 
imprinting, (b) through certain forms of intimate social con-
tact (feeding, copulation, grooming, duetting, also, notably 
aggressive conflicts), or (c) through long association. 
Generally, familiär conspecifics release attachment be-
havior, whi le strangers are apprehensively avo ided or at-
tacked. H i g h degrees of familiarity are normal ly limited to 
members of the core family. If an imals live in larger groups, 
they are forced to stay in close contact with conspecifics that 
are only slightly familiär a n d , therefore, represent a Poten-
tial source of arousal . In such cases low familiarity has to be 
compensated by h igh uniformity of behavior. 
If group members become conspicuous, whether through 
a physical deformity (5), or through unusual behavior (in 
w i l d geese: first copulation of a pair in spring), arousal is 
activated a n d the group w i l l react, mi ldly or violently, by 
"mobbing" them. 
Is there a n y indication that animals " m o b b e d " by their 
o w n group do experience something like "shame"? Unfor-
tunately, the response to " m o b b i n g " has not yet been stud-
ied explicitly. In w i l d geese a "cr inging posture" appears in 
this S i tuat ion , a posture also displayed by low r a n k i n g ani -
mals. Interestingly, the Signal through w h i c h y o u n g males 
indicate courtship motivation is formally related to this 
posture. 
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Rank order and "conscience" 
In hierarchical ly organized groups it m a y be observed 
that a behavior w h i c h could lead to Intervention by h igh 
ranking animals is shunned even in the absence of such 
animals . 
Frequently, a lpha-animals w i l l not tolerate sexual ac-
tivities on the part of low ranking group members. In this Sit-
uation, the affected group members m a y even undergo 
physical atrophy of their sexual organs (1). Chimpanzees (6) 
a n d dogs (16), w h e n kept under h u m a n control, m a y per-
manently "internalize" prohibitions. They show signs of fear 
w h e n tempted—even if encouraged by their master—to de-
viate from the "good" behavior pattern a n d they display a 
" b a d conscience" if caught in or briefly after a transgression. 
POSSIBLE E X P L A N A T I O N S O F M O R A L -
A N A L O G O U S BEHAVIOR 
Biological Systems establish a part icular interplay of sit-
uations a n d behaviors. A scientific "explanation" of this in-
terplay may attempt either (a) a n analysis of the internal 
(physiological, psychological) causality that determines the 
course of this interplay, or (b) a n analysis of the external 
(phylogenetic, selective) causality that explains w h y the 
System c a n survive only with exactly this form of interplay. 
In keeping with common scientific usage, I refer to the first 
kind of analysis as " causa l " (in a narrower sense), a n d to 
the second as "functional ." 
The earlier assertion, favored by ant i -Darwinian die-
hards, that moral-analogous behavior contradicts the prin-
ciple of natural selection because selection c a n produce 
only unconstrained selfishness has been refuted by the re-
cent work of sociobiology. 
Ritualized Fights and ESS 
F u n c t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n : J. M a y n a r d Smith has clarif ied 
the selective advantage of ritualized combat by a p p l y i n g 
his concept of "Evolutionari ly Stable Strategy" ((10, 11, 12), 
see also his paper, this volume). A n ESS is a strategy of be-
havior that, if used by a l l members of the group, could not 
be bettered by a n y i n d i v i d u a l group member adopting a n 
alternative strategy. 
M a y n a r d Smith has shown that reckless, uninhibited ag-
gressivity ("hawk"-strategy) is not necessarily more a d v a n -
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tageous than ritualized combat ("dove"-strategy). Admit-
tedly, a "dove" f ighting a "hawk" might not be able to 
retreat uninjured, as the model supposes. A rattlesnake 
only Willing to box a n d wrestle with his r ival could not re-
treat quickly enough if the latter suddenly b e g a n to use his 
venomous teeth. But he w o u l d still have time, i n a quick re-
flex movement, to bite back! This is not "dove"-behavior, 
though; it is what Price has ca l led "retaliator" strategy. It 
turns out that retaliation is the ESS i n the g iven case, with a 
sizeable minority of true "doves" tolerated. General ly, in an-
imals with dangerous weapons a preference for ritual com-
bat c a n be expected to evolve, but this should not go so far 
as to render a majority of individuals unable or unmoti-
vated to retaliate if the partner violates the ritual. 
Causal explanation 
The causal analysis of these behaviora l strategies is still 
in its infancy. Lorenz (9) reasonably argues that refraining 
from injurious f ighting is not due to a n overal l reduction of 
aggressivity, but rather to the development of addit ional in-
hibiting factors. 
Kinship and Altruism 
F u n c t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n : Altruistic behaviors (care of the 
young, social grooming, group defense, etc.) w h i c h are to 
the advantage of the recipient at a cost to the donor can be 
evolutionarily stable, as long as these behaviors are d i -
rected at relatives or the marr iage partner, that is, at indi-
viduals whose descendants share part of the donor's gen-
otype (15). 
Causal e x p l a n a t i o n : To ensure that preferential treatment 
c a n be correlated positively with degree of kinship, it must 
be the case that the probability of meeting a relative is 
greater than that of meeting a nonrelative, or that the indi-
v i d u a l is able to process cues that are correlated with the 
degree of kinship. 
The most important cue for kinship is f a m i l i a r i t y , espe-
cial ly w h e n established in early chi ldhood, for example 
through imprint ing. Familiarity established through sexual 
partnership is another example, since mates, albeit non-
relative, have common progeny. 
The necessity of cues for kinship has been stressed by 
Dawkins ((3), p. 110). He mentions as a n example the ability 
of some birds to distinguish their " o w n eggs" from those of 
O n the Phylogeny of Human Morality / 55 
strangers. But it mus: be noted that the category "stränge" 
has two possible opposites—namely, what is my o w n a n d 
what is familiär to me. " O w n n e s s " is cognitively far more 
complex than mere familiarity (= low level of Stimulus nov-
elty) is a sufficient signal for kinship. 
The fol lowing mechanisms are important in this regard: 
1. Mothers or parents quickly become familiär to their 
newborn or hatched off spring, perhaps even become im-
printed on them. 
2. Parents general ly limit caretaking behavior to familiär 
chi ldren; unfamil iar ones are rejected, attacked, or even 
eaten. 
3. Off spring accordingly seek out familiär conspecifics 
("attachment motivation") a n d a v o i d unfamil iar conspecif-
ics ("fear of the stranger"). 
4. A s long as the attachment motivation persists in the life 
of a n i n d i v i d u a l , it is more probable that a n encountered 
conspecific is a relative. 
5. The coupl ing of altruistic behavior with the familiarity 
requirement exerts the intragroup conformity pressure men-
tioned i n the discussion of " m o b b i n g . " 
Genetic Variability and Incest Barriers 
F u n c t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n : Homogeneity of the group is 
counteracted b y outbreeding. If the infantile attachment 
motivation persisted until a n d throughout sexual maturity, 
inbreeding w o u l d be the obligatory result. Homozygosis, 
thus affected, w o u l d limit genetic variability, a n d hence 
evolutionary adaptability, to such a n extent that the line 
could no longer compete with a n outbreeding variant (1). 
Causal e x p l a n a t i o n : The mechanism effective in inbreed-
ing-avoidance is basical ly the fol lowing (2): in early chi ld-
hood familiär conspecifics are markedly responded to with 
attachment, unfamil iar ones with fear. In adolescence, this 
pattern diminishes or even reverses: the family is avoided 
("surfeit reaction"), unfamil iar conspecifics become objects 
of fascinated approach . This reversal is o w i n g to a n in-
creased appetence for arousal a n d a reduced dependency 
in this phase. The same factors l ead to dissatisfaction with a 
possibly low position in the intra-family rank order. A l l these 
changes entail the departure from the family a n d the forma-
tion of new relationships. In the adult stage some need for 
security reappears, but the new partner has meanwhi le be-
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come sufficiently familiär through exploration a n d sexual 
interaction to be a n appropriate attachment object. 
POSSIBLE P H Y L O G E N E T I C R O O T S O F H U M A N 
M O R A L C A T E G O R I E S 
A r e the moral-analogous motives that keep a n i m a l be-
havior ba lanced still present in man? Anthropologists often 
point to Frazer's argument (4), according to w h i c h culture 
would not need to proscribe what nature a l ready prevents. 
If this were correct, only the excitatory forces in a n i m a l 
motivation w o u l d be preserved in m a n , whereas the inhibi -
tory ones w o u l d have atrophied. But there is evidence in 
favor of moral-analogous inhibitions h a v i n g survived an-
thropogenesis. Persons familiär since ear ly chi ldhood are 
conspicuously avo ided as sex partners (1). A n inhibit ion 
against infanticide, postulated by ethologists (9), has been 
reasonably substantiated in the case of infants w h o have 
been nursed at least once (13). 
In the following, the thesis w i l l be presented that the phy-
logenetic transition from moral-analogous behavior to hu-
m a n morality is characterized by three processes: 
1. The instincts regulat ing a n i m a l behavior, both excita-
tory a n d inhibitory, are d a m p e d in m a n . They do not disap-
pear, but they do lose their compel l ing character a n d turn 
into emotional appeals . 
2. Their spectrum is broadened through addit ional dif-
ferentiation. 
3. Cul tura l superstructures shape this basic material into 
new a n d specifically h u m a n forms. 
These changes are seen as corollaries of a development 
that took place not pr imari ly in the realm of motivation but 
rather in the realm of C o g n i t i o n . 
Time-Representation 
The basic hypothesis is this: the evolutionary step decisive 
for man, achieved hal fway only by chimpanzees, consists in 
"time-representation." 
Every organism normal ly responds with b e h a v i o r s to sit-
u a t i o n s in such a w a y that the probability of survival of his 
genome is kept near a local m a x i m u m . A "Situation" is de-
fined through momentary features of the e n v i r o n m e n t a n d 
through the current n e e d s of the organism. The m a x i m u m 
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achievable reproductive benefit of a behavior depends on 
the current environment-need constellation. If the Situation 
is such that the two do not match (e.g., rieh supply of solid 
food in the State of thirst), then even a n optimal behavioral 
strategy c a n achieve only insufficient benefit. 
A n i m a l intelligence partly overcomes this limitation. 
W h e n solving problems, higher primates appear to shift 
things a r o u n d in their " imaginat ion . " In other words, they 
are able to represent not only the pereeived environment 
but also other environments w h i c h are possible, but at the 
moment not yet extant. These environments are tested for 
their potential benefits, as compared with the current State 
of need. The best of these alternatives is then realized. 
This basic strategy is l imited to antieipating potential en-
vironments whi le the momentary State of need remains un-
changed. M a n has adopted a higher strategy. Here future 
states of need also p lay a role in the decision process. Such 
a strategy involves two features: (1) possible environments 
are tested relative to present a n d future needs for maximal 
benefit; a n d (2) the environment be longing to the maximal ly 
beneficial outcome is real ized whenever this c a n be done, 
independently of, or even in contradiction to, the current 
need. 
Emotional Consequences of Time-Representation 
This behavior strategy goes far beyond the reaches of a n -
i m a l intelligence. Antic ipatory i m a g i n g based on the cur-
rent State of need remains fixed in the present. With the 
representation of future needs, the temporal fixation be-
comes movable . The set of situations with w h i c h the organ-
ism can cope, a n d now also m u s t cope, is thus extended by 
one dimension—from the present space to the represented 
space-time cont inuum. This leads to a n increase in Strategie 
efficiency, but it also has drastic emotional consequences 
that basical ly affect a n d shape h u m a n morality. 
Existential anxiety 
The newly represented time-space is mostly filled with 
u n c e r t a i n t y . I i s intellectually manageable parts remain tiny 
compared to the rest. Uncertainty is related to u n f a m i l i a r i t y 
a n d , like the latter, evokes a n x i o u s , rather than merely neu-
tral, feelings. These feelings combine with whatever gen-
eral threat is characteristic of the time (atomic bomb, war, 
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pollution, plague, Cancer) a n d culminate in the foreboding 
of our o w n inevitable death. This "existential anxiety" is 
specifically h u m a n ; it is the first pr ice we p a y for time-
representation. 
Motivational instability 
Even at the a n i m a l level there are a l w a y s several needs 
competing in the determination of current behavior. A s a 
rule, only one need c a n be met at a time; the others must be 
suppressed, at least temporarily. This feature alone gives 
rise to conflicts, w h i c h increase mani fo ld w h e n time-repre-
sentation is introduced a n d future needs are also taken into 
account. 
If future needs are to have a chance to compete with ac-
tual needs, it is necessary that the "energy" of the latter be 
somehow attenuated. The actual needs—excitatory a n d in-
hibitory—must be reduced from the Status of massive deter-
miners of behavior to that of motivating appeals . 
Thus the i n d i v i d u a l force of conflicting motives is re-
duced, whi le at the same time their number .is increased. 
The result is a poor stability of motivation. This is the second 
price to be p a i d for time-representation. 
Simultaneous identification 
Identity, or "sameness," is a phylogenet ical ly old cogni-
tive category. It achieves object constancy over time (the 
rabbit d isappear ing beh ind the bush a n d the one appear-
ing on the other side are identical). Identity does not require 
equality—things c a n change, but remain themselves. In 
contrast, two s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a p p e a r i n g objects may be 
equal , a n d they m a y be mistaken for each other, but on the 
infra-chimpanzee a n i m a l level, there is no behavior indicat-
ing that they are kept apart a n d nevertheless regarded to 
be the "same." The Situation changes when future processes 
c a n be incorporated into the present. A n object, or one's 
own body, must then be imaginab le in a place different 
from the one actual ly occupied. Time-representation would 
not work without the identity relation be ing capable of si-
multaneously br idg ing spatial distance. 
The most a m a z i n g of the now possible achievements is 
the awareness of the identity of oneself with one's o w n re-
flection in the mirror. This reflection shows a conspecific. 
Once the identity with t h i s "conspecific" has been estab-
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l ished, m a n cannot but see himself, to a degree, mirrored in 
a n y conspecific. The gap between "ego" a n d "others" is 
partly br idged by the new identity category. 
A s a consequence, m a n is capable of directing social mo-
tives (love, aggression, responsibility, etc.) toward h i m s e l f 
(which has little to do with a neglected chick compulsively 
plucking its o w n feathers). Conversely, a n individual 's self-
i s h feelings m a y beg in to protect others—since he cannot 
help identifying with them. (Greedy people cannot bear it 
w h e n others waste their money; a y o u n g m a n emotionally 
exploited by his mother may participate in a demonstration 
against exploitation of the working class; w e l a u g h w h e n a 
c lown stumbles.) 
A g a i n the space of motivational possibilities is substan-
tially expanded, with numerous new sources of conflict 
opening u p (an example is the conflict between expulsion 
a n d care of sick group members). This is the third problem 
incurred i n time-representation. 
Human Morality 
A n immense diversity of motives, ambiguous in directing 
action, but taking vengeance if neglected a n d overshad-
owed by omnipresent existential anxiety—this is the prob-
lem to be solved by h u m a n morality. 
Mythological ideas 
H u m a n imaginat ion, capable of dreaming up possible 
future environments a n d ego-states, is not bound to a 
strict down-to-earth level . It c a n produce mythological ideas 
that reduce the inherent emotional tensions. Here we f ind 
the consoling eschatologies of religions, a n d also the so-
cialist utopia of a paradise of general solidarity, or the 
capitalist ideology of the unlimited possibilities of personal 
development. 
Psychological realization 
For such mythological motifs to become effective shields 
against anxiety a n d a solid foundation for emotional sta-
bility, their "psychological reality" must be raised to the 
highest possible level . The "psychological reality" of a n idea 
depends on its b e i n g grounded in everyday experience. 
Unlike scientific or technical ideas, myths are not wel l con-
firmed by experience. Dogmatic repression of contradicting 
experience is of some help here. But by far the most effective 
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procedure in translating myths into reality is to let them g a i n 
influence on behavior: to act them out, a n d to provide that 
others do the same. This is w h y myths breed morals. 
Ritualization 
A n anxiety-reducing strategy practiced a l ready on the 
a n i m a l level—the strategy of adher ing r igidly to behavioral 
patterns that have once proved successful, or at least not 
harmful—is mainta ined by m a n . The previous success of 
such patterns m a y have been purely accidental , as in some 
magic superstitions, or it m a y have ref lected causal connec-
tions actually encountered, albeit poorly understood. Such 
causal connections m a y involve p h y s i c a l factors, as in the 
experiences l eading to dietary proscriptions, or p s y c h o l o g i -
cal factors, as in experiences involv ing the emotional con-
sequences of time-representation. Part icularly the latter fac-
tors, be ing universal ly h u m a n , should l e a d to a certain 
uniformity a n d universality in basic moral norms. 
Clan formation 
A natural counterbalance to anxiety is attachment to fa-
miliär conspecifics. In m a n , the capabil i ty of imaginat ion to 
move a long the time axis a l lows genealogica l conceptions 
to develop; the family c a n thus be extended to the c lan . Be-
cause of its size, the clan provides more security than the 
relatively defenseless Single family. But a n indiv idua l can-
not know each of his fellow c l a n members. F a m i l i a r i t y must 
therefore be supplemented by meticulously maintained 
u n i f o r m i t y , through common vernacular, common cultural 
knowledge, common totem, a n d especial ly through a com-
mon moral code. Since the readiness for altruistic behavior 
increases with familiarity, a n d since, therefore, the practice 
of such behavior is a means to raise the "psychological real-
ity" of familiarity, there exists especial ly emphatic moral 
norms of altruism toward c lan members. In fact, in primitive 
cultures altruistic norms apply only to c lan members, a n d 
are often reversed for foreigners. This dichotomy is miti-
gated only slightly by the a l l - h u m a n identification process 
mentioned earlier. 
Shame 
G r o u p members w h o violate norms are "mobbed. " A n 
a n i m a l that does not conform to the group usually behaves 
as if it does not understand w h y it is mobbed. It may react 
with conflict behavior, anxiety, or depression. The h u m a n , 
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capable of self-reflection, c a n compare himself to the others 
a n d perceive himself to be deviant. Through identification 
with the group, he participates in their emotional reaction to 
his deviance. This intrinsic conflict m a y be the new element 
in h u m a n shame. 
A person w h o is a s h a m e d feels as if he has "lost face." 
Face, in this context, is something like a mask, conceal ing 
his identity from unauthorized eyes. So is the garment he 
wears. To recognize oneself in the mirror is to understand 
that one has two s i d e s — a n internal seif a n d a n external 
face. The internal seif is centered on a core, but has no dis-
tinct b o u n d a r i e s . O n l y the mirror reveals that I a m a G e -
stalt, with definite boundaries, constant over time. 
These boundaries define h o w others perceive me. What I 
a m to others m a y be different from what I a m to myself. Tol-
erating such a discrepancy m a y be a comfortable w a y to 
conform to group expectations a n d at the same time gratify 
indiv idual needs. T h i s k ind of insincerity has no counterpart 
in lower animals . Such a discrepancy, however, causes ten-
sions in m y feeling of identity: core a n d face do not match. 
Tensions of this k ind seem to be typically involved in h u m a n 
shame. 
Obedience and awe 
A m o n g the familiär conspecifics providing security, the 
parents are of paramount importance because they are 
most strongly motivated to offer protection a n d assistance. 
But to get the benefit of their protection one has to accept 
their superior rank position. Thus a connection between 
security a n d obedience is preestablished. Moreover, in a 
h u m a n group the parental figures are the ones who are 
in possession of the traditional knowledge accumulated by 
the culture; it is from them that one hopes to receive a l l the 
remedies for emotional disorder a n d anxiety. From this point 
of view w e understand the part icularly strong moral de-
m a n d for a w e of the parents, a n d also, the apotheosis of pa-
rental figures to deities act ing as warrantors of the moral 
norms. Amoral i ty c a n thus become a form of metaphysical 
disobedience. 
Revenge and guilt 
Retaliation c a n occur, even as a n evolutionarily stable 
strategy, i n animals . But i n animals it remains bound to the 
current Situation: reports of de layed revenge a m o n g ani -
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mals are anthropomorphisms. With time-representation, re-
venge in the true sense is possible. Unl ike animals , m a n 
must live with the expectation that anyone injured by h im 
m a y a t some t i m e retaliate. 
This retaliation expected at some uncertain time is an ex-
tremely grave cause of anxiety, part icular ly if it is believed 
to come from mythological powers retaliating for disobe-
dience of moral norms. The expectation of inevitable but de-
layed punishment is manifested in the feeling of guilt. In 
order to reduce the tension of this expectation, actions are 
often performed that a n t i c i p a t e what is feared ("self-punish-
ment"). Moreover, negative experiences (illness, loss, war, 
natural catastrophes) tend to be interpreted as retaliation 
for unnoticed personal offenses a n d hence arouse guilt feel-
ings. Conversely, the Interpretation of positive experiences 
as a reward for personal virtue, such as the (Calvinistic) 
view of prosperity as a visible sign of personal uprightness, 
originates in the same source. 
Exogamy and original sin 
In v iew of the special role of the theocratic kinship group 
as a factor compensat ing for existential anxiety, it is a l l the 
more difficult to act i n conformance to the emotional aver-
sion against incest. Therefore, part icular ly strict exogamy 
rules are necessary to prevent group members from trying 
to escape existential anxiety by a l l o w i n g themselves to be 
devoured by the ogre-mother-goddess K a l i . Emancipat ion 
from the familiär, however, must not result in the breaking 
up of cultural tradition. This is no simple task, as the corre-
sponding mechanisms of family dissolution in the a n i m a l 
kingdom entail the serious chal lenge of parental authority 
a n d the discontinuance of a l l relations. 
The tension created by this problem area is probably in-
escapable. In myth, the unavoidable step of g a i n i n g per-
sonal maturity is therefore frequently seen as or iginal sin 
(Adam a n d Eve, Lucifer, Prometheus). 
C O N C L U S I O N : M O R A L I T Y A S A SELF-
REPLICATING M E M E C O M P L E X 
Dawkins (3) outlines the idea that cultural Contents, such 
as moral norms a n d their mythological context, w h i c h he 
calls "memes," are propagated in a w a y that makes them 
comparable to genes. 
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Replication 
Mernes are structures that can , through Imitation, spread 
from their material carrier (a h u m a n brain) to other carriers. 
Imitation c a n take place voluntarily, or by Suggestion, or 
simply i n response to threat: a meme c a n be successful just 
because it is appea l ing to part icular ly violent brains w h i c h 
then begin to spread it on Crusades. 
Similar to genes, w h i c h construct organisms to insure 
their o w n replication, some mythologies have created a 
kind of superorganism: the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the churches, 
states, societies, a n d the like. A n d just as the archaeologist 
finds skeletons of organisms w h i c h no longer have a n y 
genes to pass on, we too m a y encounter cultural fossils— 
petrified institutions, or r ig id dogmatic skeletons from w h i c h 
the myth has long escaped, but w h i c h m a y persist for hun-
dreds of years until they crumble to dust under the powerful 
arr ival of new, vital ideas. 
Variation 
Mernes c a n emerge spontaneously, a n d they c a n un-
dergo change at each replication. Variation is a n important 
precondition to evolution: selection needs a rieh supply of 
variants to be able to ensure adjustment a n d improvement. 
To produce Variation, memes take advantage of a genet-
ically preformed feature: the autonomy c la im of adoles-
cence. H a v i n g actually come into be ing as a n incest bar-
rier, the youthful fever of independence, with its disgust at 
familiär surroundings a n d its setting out into the wor ld of the 
unknown, is the appropriate nutrient soil for new ideas. It is 
therefore, in a l l cultures, the youth w h o ensure that old 
forms are reinfused with new vitality, or destroyed w h e n 
their time has come. 
Selection 
The chance that a meme w i l l be passed on or be forgotten 
depends upon, a m o n g other things, its content. It is aptly 
stressed by Dawkins that the selection of memes is inde-
pendent of the selection of genes. There are interactions: 
memes c a n have a genetic effect; a society that hangs 
young thieves breeds honesty. However, it is not a neces-
sary condition for the "success" of a moral norm that it some-
how enhances the reproduetive chances of the moral indi-
v idual , let alone of his group. Faulty assumptions of this 
kind eneumbered the older "b io logica l " explanation of the 
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incest taboo, according to w h i c h cultures a l l o w i n g incest 
d ied out due to Inbreeding depression. 
But what is it that makes a moral i d e a successful? In genes 
success depends on "adaptat ion." What are memes adopted 
to? E a c h behavior is based on a complicated interplay of ex-
citatory a n d inhibitory motives w h i c h are accompanied by 
corresponding affects a n d feelings. Such affects c a n be 
pleasant or unpleasant a n d the organism behaves in such a 
w a y as to seek a n d secure pleasant affects a n d avoid un-
pleasant ones. To this extent his behavior is purposive. The 
pleasantness of affects is in some w a y correlated with the 
reproductive payoff of the behaviors concerned. But the in-
d iv idua l knows nothing of this connection, a n d even if he 
knew of it he w o u l d continue to do the things he likes be-
cause he likes them, a n d not because they perpetuate his 
genome. 
The connection between affective reward a n d reproduc-
tive benefit is only a S t a t i s t i c a l one: behaviors carry the pre-
m i u m of be ing "pleasant" w h e n the car ry ing of this pre-
m i u m has frequently enough p a i d its w a y in the past. A n d 
the premium is then r igidly adjoined to them even when , 
because of part icular conditions, their biological purpose is 
missed. 
H a p p i n e s s , def ined as the quintessence of a l l toward 
which we strive, is thus a n archaic s i g n a l of reproductive 
success, but basical ly one that m a y be misleading, par-
ticularly in m a n . The acquisit ion of time-representation has 
led to dislocations in the rea lm of emotions: There are be-
haviors that appear as both duty a n d trespass, that harbor 
both happiness a n d horror; there are impulses with goals to 
be reached only if one acts against them, a n d so on. This 
does not impair the reproductive efficiency of m a n ; but he is 
expelled from Paradise. 
Mythological or moral ideas, then, do not evolve because 
they promote the phys ica l survival of m a n k i n d . They are ac-
cepted or rejected according to the degree to w h i c h they as-
sist in f inding a n d hold ing on to points of equi l ibr ium in the 
paradoxical field of h u m a n emotion. W h e n they find their 
niche in t h i s ecology, they then have the chance to endure, 
the chance that temples a n d palaces be built for them, vir-
gins consecrated, a n d h u m a n hearts sacrif iced in their 
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honor, the chance that they be immortal ized in hymns a n d 
carved into the face of rocks, the chance that martyrs bear 
witness to them, a n d that missionary conquistadores lay the 
world i n ruin so as to make them triumph in millions of sub-
jugated brains. 
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